KAUTILYAN PRINCIPLES AND THE LAW OF NATIONS:
A COMMENT*

by

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1. Eurocentrism and the Law of Nations:

The full significance of Professor Charles Alexandrowicz's varied and valued historical researches in the inter-state relations in Asian countries still awaits assimilation in contemporary thinking about international law.\(^1\) If I may sum up in a few words the message I derive from his superb contributions, it amounts to this: Eurocentrism in scholarly thinking about international law is anachronistic. I would even go further and assert that persistent Eurocentrism in international legal scholarship as well as in the sphere of social learning as a whole cannot but be pernicious both in terms of development of learning in general and in those of progress towards a more viable future world legal order.

From the perspective of human history the colonial epoch, however significant, cannot be regarded as being more than a brief interlude in the historical life of the colonized nations. Thus viewed, it also becomes clear that much of the current rhetoric about "new nations", and their acceptance of international law does not make much sense in terms of "old" and "new". Nations which have now joined international political and economic organisations are "new" only from the limited perspective of the mid-twentieth century history. Deprivation of their political freedom by colonial powers cannot be said to have extinguished their "nationhood" in any significant use of that term; nor, indeed, is there any compelling need

\(^1\) A first draft of this Paper was presented to the Australian Society of Legal and Social Philosophy, University of Sydney, in 1967. The lamented Charles Alexandrowicz has taken note of the main positions in his "Kautilan Principles and the Law of Nations" By Ybk. Int. Law (Vol. XLII, (1965-66), 301.

* 1. The theme of interaction between the Asian state practice and classical international law has been discussed by Professor Alexandrowicz in a number of learned articles. A compact and at the same time comprehensive discussion of the subject may be found in Alexandrowicz, "Treaty and Conflict of Laws in the Roman and Early English Law in the Common Law System" (1960), 203-231. See also, "The Concept of Eastern Law in the History of International Law in the Early East India Company" (1957), 119-140.
to regard "Western" and colonial powers as being significantly "old" nations. History is a great equaliser; and at any rate to the realities and perplexities of mid-twentieth century all nations come as relative strangers.

The present world tensions, it needs scarcely any emphasis, arise not from newness v. oldness of nations participating in contemporary international legal order, and thus assisting creation of a future world legal order, but rather from vast disparities between the developed Western nations and woefully underdeveloped ex-colonial nations. The verbal vendetta against the so-called European international law makes sense only as an articulation of the powerful urge felt by the emancipated nations for self-assertion as a pre-condition for an international egalitarian world order."*  

The active presence of Eurocentrism, howsoever incarnated, exacerbates rather than mitigates world tensions and often creates an unavoidable diversion of energies and resources of international organisations. A Demise of Eurocentrism is accordingly not merely a necessity for academics and publicists. They merely form the vanguard in the procession of change. Respect for the political and cultural traditions of the "new" nations can only be fostered in the minds of statesmen responsible for the future of the world when their awareness of this heritage is sharpened. To treat an African or an Asian delegate or diplomat as a representative of a "new" or "under-developed" nation is more often than not to relegate these categories their cultural and political heritage. Knowledge of both Machiavelli and Kautilya may be found in an Indian diplomat, whereas the existence of Kautilya may well be news to his European colleague.

2. The psychological component of international relations is very often overlooked. See the insightful analysis in O. Klineberg, The Human Dimension of International Relations (1963). The passionate insistence by small and developing nations on equality and sovereignty should be seen less as a manifestation of irredentist tendencies and more as expressive of search for outlets for creativity on their part. An egalitarian world order has yet to evolve and in this the participation and the creative role of the new nations, through the structure of equality principle, has yet to be fully grasped. In this context, see the masterly exposition of the equality principle, Julius Stone, "Approaches to the Notion of International Justice" in 1. Future of World Legal Order, (Falk and Black, eds.), (1969). For a useful theoretical formulation of "criteria of Justness" in World Order see A. Tammelo, "World Order and "Enslaves of Justice", Ottawa Law Review.

3. The non-recognition of the rich heritage of traditions of statecraft in the colonial countries is surely one of the driving forces behind the attempts to "universalise" the learning and teaching of international law. For a useful analysis (though inadvertent in this aspect of the movement) in this direction in the United Nations, see Hazard, "Editorial Comment," 60, American Journal of International Law (1966), 342; and Fine, "Note" 15, International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1966), 1165. The term "Eurocentrism" is here not used as a pejorative. It refers to both conscious and unconscious methods of thinking and accumulated cognitive habits, which lead to a quiescent acceptance of European (or Western) intellectual and socio-cultural traditions as an invariable, and often superior, framework of inquiry. The days of ungracious denigration of Afro-Asian traditions, one would hope, are over. None, for example, would accept today the infamous statement of Macaulay who said that a dozen European books are worth more than a whole library of Indian (or Eastern) books.

So strong are the Eurocentric habits of thought, however, that an almost continuous dialectic between Asian and Eurocentric writers seems to persist even till today. Thus, for example, Dr. Kosambi still finds it necessary to refute the view of A. B. Keith, who said: "It would indeed be melancholy if this (i.e., the Arthastra) were the best that India could show as against the Republic of Plato or the Politics of Aristotle, or even the common sense and the worldly wisdom of the Author of the tract on the Constitution of Athens formerly ascribed to Xenophon." Quoting this, Kosambi responds: "This is a bit of pretentious irrelevance. Aristotle's royal pupil Alexander did not put the learned Stagirite master's political ideas into action. Athenian democracy failed after a singularly brief span, for all the supposed political wisdom of its constitution precisely because of Plato's closest friends... In contrast, the Indian State we have described (i.e., Magadha) grew without a setback from small and primitive beginnings to its intended final size. The Greeks made excellent reading; the Indian treatise worked infinitely better in practice for its own time and place." Later in the book, however, Kosambi usefully acknowledges that the "... brahmin indifference to past and present reality not only erased Indian history but a great deal of real Indian culture as well. The loss may be estimated by imagining the works of Aristotle, Herodotus, Thukydides and their contemporaries as replaced by priestly ritual as rewritten for the medieval Patrologia Latina of Migne, supplanted by excerpts from the Gesta Romanorum." Kosambi, The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India in Historical Outline (1965), 141 and 174 respectively.

4. This would not be surprising because standard books on the history of law of nations scarcely mention Asian and African sources and traditions of international law e.g., Nussbaum, A Concise History of Law of Nations (Rev. ed., 1953). Even this edition has only one paragraph on Hindu traditions and Kautilya is nowhere mentioned. It will of course be futile, though instructive as a study in Eurocentrism, to look for a proper perspective of these traditions in other writers such as Oppenheim. This neglect is also evidenced by most Indian (and I am sure this applies to other indigenous) textbooks. Kautilya makes a brief appearance in Professor Friedmann's recent book, see infra n. 9, but even that does not take any account of Alexandrowicz's work, and consequently of course of the real contribution of Kautilya thought.
Indian traditions cannot always be treated with a gentle bemusement. I here agree with somewhat harsh strictures of Professor Friedman that an "...artificial inflation of cultural distinctiveness in the field of international relations and law is more than just a harmless exercise in hypocrisy and narcissism."

It is precisely in this spirit that I also welcome the sobering formulation of a set of thirty-seven questions by Professor Julius Stone to an All-India Seminar on Possible Contributions of Indian Traditions Concerning the Relations of Major Organised Groups to Contemporary Problems of International Law in 1960. A wider dissemination and a deeper study of this report will certainly provide the most effective antidote to surviving tendencies towards a mythopoetic idealisation of India's past and suggest fruitful avenues of analytical and historical research in Indian political tradition and theory. It would seem, however, that one of the unintended consequences of the Seminar discussions has been a general devaluation of the significance of Indian thought in this area, this in turn reinforcing Eurocentric tendencies already present. To combat this effectively, a readjustment of perspectives seems very necessary and I am happy that Professor Alexandrowicz has here provided a welcome lead by asserting at the outset that it is futile, if not totally meaningless, to seek to relate the ancient Indian traditions of statecraft either to the contemporary international law and or-

8. Derreti, for example, prefaced his comment on the Delhi Seminar (infra n.10) by a light-hearted observation: "Talk to a knowledgeable Hindu about religion and you will be given to understand that Hinduism has all the answers". Much in the same vein, we are tempted to say that by this standard at least a large majority of Hindus must be treated as ignoramuses since they would not venture such a response! See Derreti, "Indian Traditions and Rule of Law Among Nations", 11 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1962), 266.


10. The Proceedings of the Seminar were published by the University of Delhi, India, in 1960. Due to non-availability of this publication, I have relied on the Notes prepared by Professor Julius Stone for his personal use and I here gratefully acknowledge his kind permission for their use.

11. In scholarly discourse, reference to the Seminar has become preponderant as dispositive of the subject of possible contributions of Indian traditions to international law (e.g. n. 4 supra).

References to Professor Alexandrowicz's Hague lectures are however rare in this context. He observed in the same year: "There is...no reason to consider nineteenth century positivists as the ultimate arbiters on the frontiers between superior and inferior civilisation and of the timing of the entry of some of the ancient Asian States into the universal Family of Nations. The order in which these States entered the community of nations cannot be judged by nineteenth century standards only; it is a matter in which the views of the classic writers deserve to be taken into account." (Op. cit. n.1, 315)
der or to the international behaviour of the Republic of India in the present
times.¹¹

All emancipated nations are groomed in and have an interest in the cor-
pus of international law as developed in the preceding three centuries. No
doubt they have protested against, and in some cases flaunted, some of its
norms; and have also with some vehemence sought reconstruction of some
aspects of the law so as to take their peculiar needs and expectations into
account. But all their impatience and anxieties have a meaning be-
cause they acquiesce in most of the fundamentals of international law. In other
words, no "new" nation has sought, or probably ever will seek, with anything
even faintly approaching serious commitment, a total renunciation of all
the salient norms of international law or fixed pattern of international be-
aviour and relations, in the light of its pre-colonial and indigenous traditions
of statecraft. Making use of the latter for political or other purposes
is something entirely different from crusading to establish the relevance of
such traditions to contemporary international order.¹²

The central lesson of historical knowledge would seem to lie in the truth
that the relevance of what is past consists, above all, in understanding what
is past. To read Kautilya with Oppenheim’s glasses can lead merely to a
distortion of both; but by the same token to persist in neglecting either may
also mean, among other things, a further impoverishment of the historiogra-
phy of the law of nations.¹³

2. Principle of Dynastic Solidarity:

One of the many aspects of Professor Alexandrowicz’s thought-provoking
analysis which has particularly intrigued me is, if I may so call it, the principle
of dynastic solidarity. Before I venture to discuss it I would like to point out
the two main levels on which all analyses of ancient Indian thought have to
proceed. One level is that of theory; the other is the level of fact or history.
The transition from one to the other is often an unconscious feature of many
studies and proves to be particularly troublesome in a correct un-

¹² See Alexandrowicz, “Kautilyan Principles and the Law of Nations” 41, B.
Y.L.L. (1965-66), 301.

¹³ Such attempts are sometimes no doubt, to borrow Friedmann’s words,
“conflicts of interests” disguised as “philosophies of value”. But reconstructions of ancient
ideas or representations of modern ideas in the garb of past traditions (whether or not
these traditions are of dubious significance) may often be insightful acts of wise state-
manship rather than expressions of moral infirmities. Enunciation of non-violence or
Panchashila can be seen in both lights. And at any rate, judgements of hypocrisy
can only be made if we altogether prescind sophistication of both ethics and psychology.
Summary judgements do not, perhaps, exist in the court of conscience.

¹⁴ See the useful, though Eurocentric, account of historiography of international
law in Nussbaum, op. cit. at 291.

² Landzert, The Indian Year Book of International Affairs 236

standing and evaluation of ancient and medieval political theory. The
theory in the present case comprises of a large corpus of literature in the
Arthasastra tradition, of which Kautilya’s treatise is easily the most out-
standing. The history here consists of political and social conditions of India.
The Arthasastra of Kautilya does not mirror, though it may help a recon-
struction of, the history of the times during which it is supposed to have been
written.¹⁵ Nor does the Indian political history, while illustrating occa-
Sionally the impact of Kautilyan thought, always reflect an exclusive fidelity
To Kautilian prescriptions of statecraft. The correlation between theory
and history, in this as well as in most kinds of instances, is notoriously
difficult to establish; and here both by precept and example Professor Alexan-
drowicz has provided us with one valuable model of cautious analysis. Nev-
evertheless this methodological difficulty is ubiquitous, and in fact a part of
the cognitive situation; and it is worthwhile to recall at the outset of this comment
that the task of observing a neat distinction between theory and history is one
that really requires the dexterity of a funambulist.

Professor Alexandrowicz observes:

.... the existence of the caste system across the vertical boundaries
of hundreds of States in India and further India created a horizon-
tal stratum (the Kshatriyas) with its own bonds of solidarity. Thus
dynastic legitimism and inter-dynastic solidarity are two of the ele-
ments which cemented the otherwise heterogeneous network of States
in the Indian sub-continent.¹⁶

It would seem that implicit in the above statement are two different
though related principles oriented to indicate, and also explain, solidarity.
The first is the principle of inter-dynastic solidarity which by its name is of
limited application and would primarily be operative between or among

dynasties. It would appear also not to be specially characteristic of Indian
political system. But the second, and more important principle would be
that of intra-caste solidarity in the sense that since most rulers will belong to
the Kshatriya caste, that common belonging or social affinity will lead to
some kind of solidarity. This solidarity will appear to be widespread as
inclusive of all members of the Kshatriya caste. An ancillary observation
of Professor Alexandrowicz refers to what he calls “dynastic legitimism” by
which he seems to mean the legitimation of the political power of the
Kshatriya within the framework of ruling dynasties. While the solidarity principle

¹⁵ There is, as usual, no agreement among historians about the exact date of the
Arthasastra. Miss Romila Thapar places, after a critical study of several views,
the probable date of the treatise towards the end of the 4th century B.C. See Thapar,

¹⁶ See Alexandrowicz, Supra, note 12.
political power is one of the central enigmas of 17th century politics in India, was preponderantly Brahmin both in origin and evolution.**

These few random examples\(^1\) should suffice here to show that being a Kshatriya was an important credential rather than a passport to kingship in Indian political history. They are not intended, however, to demonstrate that intra-caste and hereditary Kshatriya affinities played no significant role in Indian history. Any such categorical conclusion will be palpably untrue. The political history of the Rajputs, who rose to political eminence in the ninth and tenth centuries, provides one of the strongest evidences of intra-caste, or at least intra-Rajput, solidarity even when their social origins are doubtful till today. In fact their vehement insistence on the Kshatriya status is taken to be suggestive of their probable foreign origin.\(^2\) There is another factor which might prompt the conclusion of intra-caste solidarity. Irrespective of their social origins all persons or elite groups aspiring or acquiring political power were usually declared to be Kshatriyas and thus legitimated by the Brahmins.\(^3\) This process of legitimation extended even in cases of apostasy. Thus the two brothers, Bukka and Harihara, who had adopted Islam, were reconverted to Hinduism and reinstated to Kshatriyadom by Brahmins in order that their ascent to royal power be facilitated. This event which was to provide some embarrassing dynastic antecedents is sometimes invoked to explain partially at least the so-called Hinduistic revival in the Vijayanagara empire in the south in the 14th and the 15th centuries.\(^4\) But these instances in general would form an exception rather than a rule.

Much the same can be said from the strictly historical viewpoint about the principle of inter-dynastic solidarity, save again with some cavet arising from the fierce caste-consciousness evidenced by the Rajputs from time to time. In fact, we have in general rather compelling evidence indicating absence of solidarity among various ruling dynasties throughout the

\(^{20}\) See P. Spear, 2 History of India (1965, Penguin): 58-60

\(^{21}\) For other illustrations, and doctrinal source-material, see Kane, 3. History of Dharmasastra, (1946), 39-40. Kane's study will hereafter simply be cited by author and volume.

\(^{22}\) See Thapar, at 227-228, for a brief account of their attempts at attaining the kshatriya status.

\(^{23}\) See above; and also Drekmier, Kingdom and Community in Early India, (1962), 38-43 and 282-300 passim; and L. Dumont, "The Concept of Kingship in Ancient India" 6 Contributions to Indian Sociology (1962), 48-77. Both these works will hereafter be referred to by Author. See also R. Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portraits (1962: Anchor Paperbacks), 142-199 passim.

\(^{24}\) Thapar, at 323-324 and 334-336.

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Indian political history. This lack is neatly illustrated by the general picture of internecine strife and helplessness during the various incursions by foreign powers, beginning with the advent of the Turks, Afghans, and Moguls to the final consolidation of the British rule in the mid-eighteenth century. Thus, for example, Dr. Romila Thapar tells us that the “Turks in India themselves felt insecure, since they feared the possibility of a Rajput confederation which strangely enough never materialised”. Turning southward we observe the same pattern: the kings of the Vijayanagara never formed any alliance to combat the Muslim advent in their proper sphere of influence. All through the process of consolidation and decline of the Mogul empire we find Hindu rulers seeking foreign support in intra-mural struggle for power. Even intra-dynastic solidarity is difficult of inference from the testimony of history.

On the whole, it appears that historical materials would not support greatly the dynastic solidarity principle and any generalisation on this aspect must remain problematic.

Theoretically also we confront many imponderables when we consider the principle of intra-caste solidarity. It is of course true that the rulers of the sub-continent were almost always (as we have seen) assimilated within the caste hierarchy as Kshatriyas even when they were not so by birth. Royal power in all cases had to be legitimised, the brahmans usually performing this function. In this sense surely we may perceive here a symmetrical social structure, lending as it were some uniformity to the Indian political scene through the ages. But while this symmetry may impart Kshatriyahood to the rulers, either by birth or by priestly legitimation, it does not seem to warrant any inference of intra-caste solidarity as a special feature of Indian political system at any given time.

But even if we were to presume the existence of such a solidarity we still encounter some formidable theoretical obstacles. Thus, I apprehend, the principle of dynastic solidarity will deprive us of any rationale for war as a political institution. To be sure, much will here depend on the meaning and extent of the solidarity principle; but basically the very idea of war would seem to be at odds with the principle. For one clear implication of the term ‘solidarity’ is some kind of cohesion which negates or repels dis-integrative or dis-cohesive behaviour. And yet war was not merely an ubiquitous feature of the Indian political scene, but was also a cardinal principle of wise statecraft, and to some extent even a part of the philosophy of state. This very same difficulty of explaining, let alone justifying, war will arise... and in a much more acute form... if were to extend the principle of intra-caste solidarity from the elite groups in the caste to all the members of the Kshatriya caste as a whole in any given community, at any given period.

That war should be an important precept of statecraft, and should also form an integral part of the royal duties, should not be surprising if we are to take into account that in some significant sense secularisation of politics, and consequently of inter-state relations, had occurred rather early in India as compared with the rest of the world. One consequence of this secularisation seems to have been a perpetual quest for power-maximisation implied in the very idea of the ultimate form of political power as wielded by an all-India conqueror. This is of course not to say that ethical and religious restraints did not operate and influence the political decision-making or statecraft but rather to suggest that they could not play a decisive role in a political system which assigns a clear supremacy to secular power. In this sense again we seem to find that the principle of solidarity would run counter to one of the essential implications of secularisation of inter-state politics.

All this then brings us to the very difficult question of the precise meaning, and depending on that the scope, of the solidarity principle. The term “solidarity” immediately recalls to one’s mind the several types of social solidarity of Durkheim. But these cannot be usefully employed here since our concern is more with the inter-state relations rather than with the bonds of solidarity arising within and prevailing between various social groups of a given community. We concede that the distinction between international in the sense that the term is used in contemporary discourse, and national societies will be of limited significance in ancient and mediaeval politics

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26. “Strife for the throne was regarded as a minor occupational hazard of kingship by Canaka (another name of Kautlya). No regard for morality or filial piety is ever in question. He quotes his predecessor’s maxims: ‘Princes, like crabs, are fathers-eaters’. Kosambi, The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India in Historical Outline (1965), 144-145.
27. Thus, Ajatsatru, one of the architects of the Magadha Empire, is said to have bililishly assassinated the gentle but old Bimbisara, his father. Paricela in fact was almost a normal method of accession to the throne in the Mauryan dynasty and the five successors of Ajatsatru are said to have succeeded to throne by paricide.
28. This is clearly implied in the theory of Mandala briefly discussed in Section 4 of this Comment. And see generally, Ghoshal, A History of Indian Political Ideas (1959), 140-41; 380-81; 490-92 and 512-13.
29. See infra n. 33.
30. See Section 4 of this Paper for the concept of an all-India ruler.
31. For a general discussion of Durkheim, see Stone, Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966), 148-50. But Drexmeier, in his superb study goes even further and argues that: “Neither of Durkheim’s categories is sufficient in itself to describe Hindu
relations which are now being considered. This while correctly alerting us to the problematics of intellectual milieu of this distinction does not entitle us to blur the inherent difference between a political system comprising a number of units (distinct sovereign kingdoms) and their relations *inter se* and the sub-systems comprising that system (i.e., the relations between the various social groups within each kingdom, the idea of kingdom being the closest approximation we have in Indian political theory to the idea of state).

Nor of course can we adopt as a precise connotation of the solidarity principle the generally homogeneous, cultural and social base of the Indian kingdoms. It may be said that these kingdoms shared common, and sometime, identical, forms of social organisation, notably the caste structure, and that this lent both a perceptual uniformity and a degree of cohesiveness that would not have been otherwise possible. It may also be said further that this sharing, as it were, of social structure facilitated inter-state relations and political communication.

This will appear more convincing in the light of Professor Dumont’s recent insightful analysis of Kingship in ancient India. Dumont actually offers in this study a re-interpretation of the caste system. Basing his views on the pioneering analysis of Hocart and Dumezil, he suggests that the system can be viewed, and fruitfully so, as a “system of oppositions” rather than as a “linear hierarchical order.” This means, for our purposes, that the hierarchical relations, wherein the Brahmins appear at the apex, only emerge as a result of the “close association or solidarity between Brahmins and Kshatriyas.” Both these combined oppose, as it were, the rest of the caste structure and act as one integrated force in relation to them. The ideological superiority of Brahmins and their factual dependence on the Kings both combined give us the situation in which “...a relation of mutual but asymmetrical dependence prevails between the two.”

The learned writer would apparently prefer to approach the Hindu society in Weberian framework as a society characterised by “traditional authority” and not involving a functional differentiation of the political and non-political forms of life. If this well-reasoned view is to be accepted, even much greater difficulties will arise in sociological transference of the inter-caste solidarity within the state-systems to inter-state relations.

32. Dumont, op. cit. supra n. 23, esp. 51-56. Writing at the same time, Drekmeier also observed a similar solidarity between the two castes: “The power of the Brahman class was due more to its control over culture than to its material position or its influence exercised through ministries. To term the Hindu State a theocracy would be to suggest its sectarian foundation on dogma and identification of magistrate and priest. This was not the case, though a strong bond existed in theory between the Brahman and society because caste organisation and religious system provided its legitimation had combined the two in a social organisation that has had few parallels in human experience” (at 262).

This highly complex Brahmin-Kshatriya relationship of inter-dependence which Dumont inspiringly takes into account not as a “contingent trait” but as a “necessary institution” leads to even more important results for inter-state relations. One consequence of Dumont’s approach is the concept of secularisation of politics, meaning (in his terms) a relative autonomy of the political domain from absolute values, which Alexsandrowicz commendably seeks to extend to inter-state relations in pre-colonial India.**

But in this process of transposition of the significant aspects of the caste structure as reinterpreted by Dumont the evidently integrative role of that structure cannot, in my opinion, be extended to inter-state relations.**a This is because of multiplicity of common forms of social organisation arising from territorial divisions into separate kingdoms. A crude illustration should suffice. It is true that the Brahmans, in close association with the Kshatriya, perform in the role of a *Purohitas*, an inter alia, a legitimating role in a given state society. But in a power conflict between two kingdoms (or states) we have obviously a pair of kings and purohitas, and notwithstanding the solidarity between them the *purohitas* of the vanquished pair can no longer perform the legitimating function. In inter-state relations then the problem of conflicting legitimating roles is resolved not through solidarity but by hostility and war, victory and defeat.

33. Dumont is careful to qualify the secularisation principle as a “relative one”. There is no doubt that this seminal perspective arising from a contemplation of Indian society as a whole has useful implications for study of inter-state relations, notably in that it reveals the perennial sociological reality of international law referred to in the text.

33a. The assertion in this paragraph should not be taken to mean that since the integrative role of the caste structure cannot be transposed to inter-state relationships, the isomorphism of the Hindu social order, revealed to us by monistic contemplation of the Indian society, has no impact on these relations. Perhaps, infrequency of *debhaliyas* can be seen as a plausible offshoot of Brahmin-Kshatriya solidarity (see Section 3, infra). The crucial question, however, is the determination of the character and impact of solidarity principle in inter-state relations, as distinct from intra-state relations. A good deal of doctrinal and historical research is needed before any final conclusion in this direction can be arrived at. See also supra n. 32, 33.

34. “Purohitas” may be rendered for our purposes as the royal chaplains. On the role of Purohitas see generally Kane, Vol. II at 40, 363 and Vol. III at 117-119.
This difficulty merely illustrates the sociological aspects of inter-state and international relations in general though it arises within a particularly indigenous, ancient and complex milieu. The difficulty consists in absence from international system of the integrative structures and solidarity bonds of the same kind and efficacy as are present in a given state society. Some would also formulate this difficulty in terms of the absence of a unificatory supra-national authority. In either case, the pre-colonial inter-state relations in India and the Kautilyan and neo-Kautilyan political theory provide us with one more illustration of an agonisingly familiar contemporary problem. And both formulations confront us with the need for systematic thinking and study of international relations. This is then as much the raison d'être of Kautilya's Arthasastra as it is of contemporary writings on international law.

3. Absence of “Debellatio” and Dynastic Solidarity:

The relative infrequency of debellatio in ancient and mediaeval state practice is certainly puzzling, more so when juxtaposed with the complex theory of mandala resting basically on aggrandisement of a hypothetical all-India ruler. Professor Alexandrowicz is inclined to think that the absence of the debellatio is one of the salient functions of the dynastic solidarity principle, discussed above. This means that common social origins and common social roles or the very kshatriyahood of all rulers makes it necessary that virtual subjugation or total deprivation of sovereignty of the vanquished ruler should be avoided as a matter of policy, if indeed it is not an ingrained characteristic of the state systems. This claim merits examination.

Most political writers on pre-colonial inter-state behaviour in India would generally agree as to the absence, or more accurately the relative infrequency, of debellatio, though it is one of the chief merits of Alexandrowicz's analysis that it studies the matter specifically from this perspective. It is generally agreed that sovereignty did not mean invariable or total exercise of control over vassals or feudatories and that even the hypothetical unifier of India would seek merely an acknowledgment of political overlordship rather than actual possession and exploitation of the conquered kingdoms. This has important bases in the theory of statecraft and we will here briefly refer to three aspects of Kautilyan thought.

Kautilya offers us a three-fold classification of conquerors: dharmavi-jayan, lobhivijayan and asuravijayan. These terms are usually rendered in English respectively as the righteous conqueror, the avaricious conqueror and the demonic conqueror. The mere presence of the prefix “dharma” in the first epithet has led most writers to interpret dharmavijayan as a ruler or a victor whose conquest is righteous, in accordance with dharma. But it is important to remember that Dharma in the tradition of statecraft and in the literature of Arthasastra school usually refers to Rajadharma, that is the dharma of the King, and not to dharma as a whole. In Kautilyan thought this distinction acquires a particular sharpness. Even though the ultimate ends of Rajadharma are not, and cannot theoretically, be different from those of dharma in general, the former is essentially confined to the political domain in which the prescriptions of righteousness generally applicable to the individual person as a moral entity do not apply in the same manner. Once this distinction is perceived, it will seem more appropriate to render the expression dharmavijayan in terms of statecraft rather than those of morality as Dr. Kane has done, as indicating a conqueror who is satisfied with obeisance or mere submission. In this sense, a dharmavijayan will differ from the


36. See generally Kane, Vol. III, at 1-16; 235-241. For a doctrinal and partly historical concensus of Rajadharma see Drekmeier, at 245-262.

37. See supra n. 35. But see for possible redefinition of the concept of Dhrmavijayan as a proselytizing war, at least in the times of Asoka, Saleatore, Ancient Indian Political Thought and Institutions (1963), 573-577. The learned author, after an examination of the views of Dr. Hultzsch, and some Indian writers, comes to the conclusion that "... Asoka completed the concept of a dharma vijayan as given in the Arthasastra by laying down rules as to what his conquered subjects were to do after they had done him the obeisance" (at 577).

With due respect to Professor Saleatore's views, it would seem that Asoka revised rather than conformed to or expanded the Arthasastra conception of a dharma vijayan. Proselytizing conquests do not appear in Kautilya's writings and at any rate it is doubtful to assert as a matter of history that Asoka embarked on such wars. See Kosambi, op. cit., supra, n. 26, at 159-60.

And also see as to the different usage of the term conquest by Asoka in R. Thapar, supra, n. 15, at 167. "By conquest Asoka does not mean the actual over-running or control of foreign territory. Thus, he includes the Greek Kingdoms of Syria, Egypt, Cyrene, Macedonia, and Epirus as having been conquered by Dharma, whereas in fact all that may have happened was a cordial exchange of embassies or missions or merely the sending of one of these by Asoka to the Greek Kings mentioned." Professor Saleatore is inadvertent to this important analysis of Asoka. He also fails to take into account the Buddhist concept of Chakravarti, which may have influenced Asoka. Chakravarti was a Pali rendering of the Sanskrit term Chakravarti meaning the world-ruler or an all-India emperor. See for a brief exposition of the Buddhist concept, Ghoshal, op. cit., supra n. 28, at 77-79.

In the general context of the Arthasastra, there appears to be no particular reason not to accept the meaning of Dharmanvijayin in terms of morality of statecraft as distinct from dharma.
other two categories of lobhijayin, and asuravijayin, the former insisting on satisfaction in land and money and the latter going even beyond these "robs the defeated king of his son, wife and life". (XII.1)

The first form of conquest was generally approved but the other two in most cases met with disapprobation, and this for good reasons as we shall see shortly. Kautiya (VII.16) prescribes that not merely the territory, wealth, sons, and wives of vanquished should not be coveted but that the conqueror should reinstate the vanquished ruler if alive or install his successor to the throne.**

With the prescriptions to the conqueror and the classification of types of conquests, Kautiya has also a reciprocal set of directives for the conduct of policy for the vanquished and weak rulers. A weak king attacked by a ruler who is the leader of the circle of states (mandala) should, Kautiya advises, submit and sue for peace, offering to the conqueror his army, treasury, territory and even himself (VII.3). Kautiya then methodically proceeds to characterize and discuss the types of agreements (sandhis), with their sub-types, which can be thus arrived at. Agreements arrived at by the submission of army are called dandapanata, those with the offer of treasury are called kospanata and those implying submission of territory are called desopanata.** The dual set of prescriptions, one with regard to the conduct of the conqueror and another with regard to the conquered, may at first impression seem somewhat inconsistent. But such inconsistency is more apparent than real. All through, Kautiya is mindful of the fact that the dangers of unrestrained force in inter-state relations are as great as those of anarchy within the national orders without dandana. If the uttarn ratio of the state within the municipal order is dandani, that of the inter-state order is survival and peace in the midst of, and notwithstanding, hostility and war. Thus, the conqueror ready to initiate war and capable of winning it, should not be allowed to indulge in liquidation or disgrace of the enemy. Likewise, the weak

king should abjure bravado and forego any opportunity for peace, offering if necessary all his possessions and showing a readiness to renounce all aspects of his sovereignty. This inculcates power bargaining processes in the inter-state relationships and helps creation of a climate for a rational management of power conflicts. The powerful ruler is never to aspire at anything more than dharma.vijaya; but the weak ruler is also to provide an impetus for peace. By the initial conception of dharma.vijaya, magnanimity of the conqueror is implied; and by stressing the posture of total but dignified submission a further incentive to the exercise of magnanimity is provided.

This magnanimity is not really a matter of the moral conscience of the monarch, though in particular instances the dictates of conscience may reinforce magnanimity. For Kautiya it is rather a precept of wise statecraft. Thus, he insists that if in the above situation the conqueror insists in violating these prescriptions, and treating the victim unjustly, his action would provoke the wrath of mandala. This again may seem inconsistent at first sight: after all, discussions of various types of conquests and treaties commence with, or contain, an acknowledgment that the conqueror is, or is postulated to be, the leader of the mandala. But this leadership in Kautiya conception is precisely a function of wise statecraft, one of the cardinal canons of which is avoidance of unnecessary use of force and extravagant claims to absolute sovereignty.

Kautiya also urges another consideration of good statecraft in this connection. In discussing the yatra.vas or kings who are vulnerable, he emphatically maintains that the "...powerful but unjust ruler should be attacked instead of a weak but just ruler" because affection and alienation of the subjects towards the king are important ingredients in a strategy of war and help a rational assessment of the prospects of victory. Loyalty of the subjects, or their affection and alienation, plays a great role not merely from the view-point of military strategy but also as furnishing the mainstay of the viability of conquest. Conversely, incitement of dissatisfaction is one of the most important parts of the preparations for war just as creation of stable loyalties is an important part of the royal duties during peace.

Finally, it is important here to note a novel distinction made by Kautiya between what he calls dvairājya and vaiśrājya. The former literally means


39. As to the various policies the weak king should adopt from the military point of view, see Ghoshal, op. cit. supra, 144-145; and Rameswamy, Essentials of Indian Statecraft (1962), 125-127, this being a selective English rendering of the Arthasastra. Neither of these seem to attach any importance to the aspects here discussed. For this see Kane, III at 68-71; 224.

39. For the various sub-types of the sandhis offered by Kautiya see Kane, Vol. III at 224-225. This classification does not even theoretically rule out debellatio. See especially the sub-types of sandhis consisting of the offer of territory.

40. But of course neither the fear of anarchy nor the prospect of continual warfare as such can be deemed to be the sole rationale for the Arthasastra admonitions. See Section 4 infra for a fuller discussion.

41. See Kane, Vol. III at 68-71. For a discussion of mandala see Sec. 4, in infra.

42. This is implied in the conception of mandala itself.

43. See Ghoshal, op. cit. supra, n. 28, at 143; and lucid exposition in Rameswamy, op. cit. supra, n. 39 at 117-120.

44. See above. And see generally, Dreikmeier, at 264-281.
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sovereignty of two and the latter simply a foreign rule. Differing from his predecessors, Kautilya maintains that dvairajya more viable than varajya because the former generally exists between father and son or between two brothers" these sharing, among other things, virtually the same political constitution and the counsel of ministers. But varajya comes into existence as a result of territorial expansion and often the foreign ruler thinking that this "country is not mine" impoverishes it and carries off its wealth or treats it as a chattel (for sale) or when he finds that the country is disaffected towards him abandons it and goes away." 45

These considerations have in general some relevance to the principle of dynastic solidarity and the non-application of debellatio. In the threefold classification of conquests and the primacy assigned to dharmavajayin, no doubt it is possible for us to see some kind of solidarity at work. Thus, Professor Basham, rendering the latter term as merely righteous or Dharmic conquest, infers that

the idea of "a righteous conquest" or "conquest according to the sacred Law" may have developed among Aryans soon after their occupation of North India, as an expression of their solidarity against the dark-skinned natives. It is evident, though not explicitly stated, in the later Vedic literature. 46

It has been pointed out earlier that the term dharmavajayin cannot be simply rendered as righteous conquest. But even with this caveat in mind, the inference of such a solidarity in the early phases of ancient India seems to us quite responsible. But it is doubtful whether this can be extended to later parts of Indian history—both ancient and medieval—and be invoked to explain the principles of statecraft developed in the heyday of Arthasastra traditions. The significance of ethnic solidarity as a principle of historical explanation diminishes with the progress of Aryanisation of India and with the emergence of relatively ethnically homogeneous social structure. 47

There is no doubt that the prescriptions for the victor and the vanquished have, both in theory and practice, the effect of making debellatio unusual in inter-state relations. It would seem that the remarkable discussion of dvairajya and varajya also offers us some indication of the awareness of inter- and possibly intra-dynastic solidarity since Kautilya considers dvairajya more viable eminently on the grounds of kinship solidarity.

45. Kane, Vol. III at 102-103.
46. Basham, The Wonder that was India (1954), 124-26.
47. See Kosambi, op. cit. supra, n. 26, at 72-95 passim.

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Thus there is some scope for invocation of dynastic solidarity as a principle of explanation for the infrequency of debellatio in Indian state practice despite the distinct possibility that the latter may also be sought to be explained on other theoretical and historical grounds. 48

48. The other grounds on which infrequency of debellatio may be sought to be explained are those of good or ideal statecraft based on the prescriptions and proscriptions of the Arthasastra and those arising from a pre-eminently economic interpretation of Indian history. Both these would require extensive doctrinal and historical research before they can serve sovereign, or as even pre-eminent, grounds for explanation of non-debellatio. We will briefly refer to these here.

(a) Interpretation arising from norms of statecraft:

We have seen that the Arthasastra attaches great importance to affection and alienation of the subjects in the strategy of territorial expansion. This is a norm of political expediency. Abstractly this consideration can be formulated as follows: If viability of territorial expansion depends eminently and always everywhere on affection and loyalty of the conquered subjects, and therefore on the maximization of the potentialities of a subsequent insurrection, then application of debellatio containing possibilities of disaffection and alienation of the vanquished subjects augments the prospects of insurrection. Therefore, non-debellatio.

The complex ideas implicit in the above formulation are summarized in three distinct hypothetical syllogisms in the hope that disadvantages arising from undue elaboration will be to some extent offset by gains in clarity.

I. If debellatio is applied then there is disaffection amongst the conquered populace.
   If there is disaffection amongst conquered populace then victory is not viable.

   Therefore, if debellatio is applied then the victory is not viable.

II. If debellatio is applied then there is disaffection amongst the conquered populace.
   If there is disaffection amongst conquered populace then insurrection is more likely to result than not.

   If debellatio is applied then insurrection is more likely to result than not.

III. If debellatio is applied then there is always and everywhere disaffection amongst conquered populace as a result of which insurrection is more likely than not.
   If always and everywhere there is disaffection amongst conquered populace as a result of which insurrection is more likely than not then the victory is not viable.

   Therefore, if debellatio is applied then always and everywhere victory is not viable.

The advantage of formulating the matter in this way lies in its stress on the comparative merits of the two broad techniques of aggression, one based on debellatio and the other based on non-debellatio. When Kautilya opted for the latter, he must have with his characteristic acumen evaluated the comparative merits of both. It would not be difficult to marshal sufficient evidence from the Arthasastra on this aspect. At the same time, to advance this norm of statecraft as the sole basis, sufficient in itself, for the non-debellatio in Indian history would be hazardous in absence of further doctrinal and historical research. One of the tasks of such a research will
4. Some thoughts on Mandala: Contemporaneity of Kautiya

The theory of Mandala was no doubt formulated earlier but it was Kautiya who developed it and made it into a cornerstone of inter-state relations. The doctrines of three iaktis or power of the king and the sadgnya or the six-fold policy of inter-state relations arise out of contemplation on the theory of mandala and are closely related to it. Kingship cannot be conceived of in absence of the three iaktis. They are utsaha, prabhuv (or prabhabha) and mantra. Kautiya defines these as meaning respectively the “force of the king’s bravery” (for his valour), the power of the treasury and army, and finally the power of knowledge of statecraft (VI.2). To the latter be to find out why if conditions similar to those obtaining in India prevailed, debellatio was still applied contrary to Indian practice. This might in turn point to the possibility, even assuming similar conditions, that the non-debellatio norm is not the only norm of ideal statecraft.

(b) Economic Interpretation:

An economic interpretation of history would seek to explain non-debellatio in terms of the basic economic motivation for territorial expansion, as can be seen from the following passage from Dr. Kosambi’s recent analysis:

“But the fruit of aggression was not direct tribute, which history shows to have been the normal motive elsewhere in antiquity. If the defeated king were reasonable (he could not survive otherwise), he could retain his old throne with all his former revenues and officials left intact. The sole right insisted upon by the conqueror was over wasteland, where clearing, settlement, mining would be conducted on behalf of the winner. If possible, this right was to be gained without war, by simple agreement with the neighbouring king. Magadh was the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. was the one state where political economy was clearly understood as a science. The others ate up their own subjects for taxes—something the Arthasastra king avoided by building up crown income directly”.

Kosambi, op. cit. supra, n. 26, at 151. (Emphasis added.)

For the full content of the discussion one must turn to the distinction between rghatra and stta lands and taxes succinctly summarised in Kosambi. See also the comprehensive analysis by J. Spengler, “Arthasastra Economics” in Brai & Spengler (eds.) Administration and Economic Development in India (1963), 224. A parallel, and much hated classification of lands existed during the Maratha Confederacy. Land was classified as swarajya or the homeland with stable administration, and mughlai or foreign land subject to frequent aggression.

We should, however, note that the above passage speaks merely of the Magadhan State where, discounting the exaggeration in the last sentence (emphasized), economic considerations may have played a significant role in non-debellatio approach. But before this economic explanation can be generalized so as to explain non-debellatio solely on that basis, adequate research in the economic history of pre-colonial India would appear to be an essential pre-requisite.

49. See Kane, Vol III at 217-222; and a recent brief exposition with an original diagrammatic representation, Spellman, Political Theory of Ancient India: A Study of Kingship from the Earliest Times to circa A.D. 300 (1964), 156-159.
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stem are clearly specified.** The nature of the political actors is also
dicted by a three-fold classification of states into: co-ordinate, major and
ior states.** Correspondingly, their progression within the power spectrum
captured in three key terms: decay, stabilisation and progress.** Morton
aplan and his associates will no doubt find in Arthasastra a valuable
parallel to their present theorising and in Kautilya one of their worthy
recursors in the realm of political theory.**

To realise the astonishing analytical sophistication (I am sure those who
ot like Kaplan school will find in Kautilya a wearisome pedantry and
ce versa) one has to read Kautilyan exposition of mandala with the
following passage of the rules of balance of power system as recently
xpounded by Morton Kaplan:

The “balance of power” international system is characterised by
the operation of the following essential rules, which constitute
the characteristic behaviour of the system: (1) increase capabilities,
but negotiate rather than fight; (2) fight rather than fail to
increase capabilities; (3) stop fighting rather than eliminate an
essential actor; (4) oppose any coalition or single actor that
tends to assume a position of predominance within the system;
(5) constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organis-
national principles; and (6) permit defeated or constrained
ational actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role part-
ers, or act to bring some previously inessential actor within
the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as
acceptable role partners.**

But as seen towards the conclusion of Section 2 of this Paper,
the contemporary significance of Kautilya also extends to basic philo-
osophical and sociological problems behind all thinking about international

54. See Ramaswamy at 117-128 op. cit n. 39.
55. Ibid, 113-115.
56. Ibid, 109-111; and Ghoshal, supra, n. 28, at 146.
57. See the pioneering study by Morton Kaplan, System and Process in Inter-
national Politics (1957). In endeavouring to establish contemporary significance of Kau-
tilya, I am mindful of the fact that facile comparisons should be avoided in the cause
of advancement of knowledge (see n. 6). But I agree fully with Drekmieh that it **is our
responsibility to apply the refinements of methodology and the social sciences in search-
ing out the intended or latent sense of the ideas that confront us. The discovery of
meanings that might otherwise remain hidden to us is a nobler employment for our
newer knowledge than its restriction to the essentially negative tasks of controverting
and deriding.” (at 283 n.)
58. Kaplan, “Some Problems of International Systems Research” in Interna-
tional Political Communities (Anchor Books, 1966), 469.

59. It is important for the understanding of the mandala theory to note that it is
an “as-if” concept. It is primarily a theoretical model. It does not assert that at any
given time there is a conqueror preparing an actual invasion any more than the formula
“one’s neighbour’s enemy” means that at any given time a neighbouring ruler is
necessarily an enemy. The theory of mandala, enshrouded by accurate summarising;
and obscured by abundant platitude, needs to be reformulated in Kautilyan precision, with
an emphasis on its abstract and scientific character. Thus, for example, the above rules of
the mandala will be reformulated as follows:

Given that a political actor X seeks territorial aggrandisment culminating in
an all-India overlordship, another political actor Y, geographically juxtaposed to
X, is more likely than not, other things being equal, to combat this tendency.

Notwithstanding the apparent science of the proposed reformulation of the
mandala, such an attempt will clarify many important aspects of the theory and expose the
the total helplessness of the designation of the theory as wearisome pedantry or idle
Brahmanic game. It will bring us closer to the functional value of the theory. More-
ever, we would learn the crucial difference between theory and history.

Only with such an approach, for example, we can make a meaningful use of Professor
Stone’s question:

“Question 24 (a): How long it (i.e. mohiya, somewhat inaccurately identified
here with ‘traditional Indian support for non-alignment and mediation’) survives if
the balance of military power between Washington and Moscow-Peking axis
were drastically disturbed? What is the relevance here of the Circle of State do-
tine (Rajmandala)?”

Prescinding the purely indigenous milieu of the mandala theory, I feel confident
that both Kautilya and Morton Kaplan will answer: “As much relevance as the balance
of power system has to the political realities in 1960 when the question was formulated.”

In other words, we have to verify whether the political system envisaged in
the mandala theory, with its rules and prescriptions, prevails in a given political milieu (here
1960). If it does, then the mandala would have a great relevance, subject to n. 60, infra.

60. The term “nuclear mandala” is intended to signify that from the perspective of
the all-India overlordship each mandala is merely nuclear. It leads to an ever-
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(a king of the earth up to its four boundaries). Thus, the vijigishu who is initially a conqueror of the nucleant mandala is ultimately to become an all-India emperor.

One great Puzzle in regard to the conception of Mandala, and therefore with the general theory of inter-state relations in pse-colonial India, seems to lie precisely in the notion of extension of power over an ever-widening scale finding its terminus in sovereignty over the entire sub-continent. Nowhere, it would seem, has a political theory been offered which seeks, as the concept of Mandala, the lordship of the whole arena of political activity as an ideal of statecraft as distinct from mere power maximization thriving on political expediency or a mere struggle for hegemony. Nowhere do we find an approximation to this idea of inter-state relationships oriented to their own perpetual extinction through the creation of a power monolith.

Dr. Percival Spear, in a slightly different context, has perceived in this what he prefers to call "the dogma of Indian indivisibility" venturing also the observation that "the extension of power to the geographical limits was not an aggression to their (i.e. Indian) minds but an expression of natural law." But in the context of the present discussion this names rather than explains the puzzle.

Professor Basham would tend to subsume this puzzle purely in terms of what he calls "Hindu militarism". While he does make an exception in recognising that the Arthastra conception of war was different from older texts, he feels that in general there existed a tradition of military glory wherein death in the battlefield was invested with a special sanctity. Basham makes a pointed reference to the practice of jahur by which many mediaeval rajput kings preferred to burn themselves rather than surrender to the enemy. Insightful as this approach is, it simply cannot be employed in explaining the primacy of the conception of all-India conqueror in the mandala theory. In addition, the moderation in recourse to war, specially urged by Kautilyan

61. On the various meanings of the term see Kane, Vol. III, at 66-68; on the meaning of this concept in Buddhist ideology see n. 37, supra.

62. See Spear, op. cit. supra, n. 20, at 52-53. Spear is remarking on the fact that even Akbar, like his predecessors and successors, in the year 1600 was obsessed with the idea of a unified India.

63. Obviously the question is "why" and not What." of the ideal of chakravartin. Hence we cannot employ fruitfully either the "dogma of Indian indivisibility" or the "expression of natural law" valuable though these insights are.

64. See supra, n. 46.

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and neo-Kautilyan writers, coupled with the generally recognized principle of negotiating to the limit would seem to be at odds with the idea of Hindu militarism as a principle of explanation. This is not to deny that Kautilya made use of the concept of matsyanyayya which was part of the intellectual heritage of Arthastra writers. But as transition from tribe to society was accomplished, and the final triumph of monarchy over clan republics occurred around 5th and 6th centuries A.D., the institution of kingship became an established datum of political thought, not requiring any reason elaboration for its existence. The fear of anarchy was then lost in the certitude of kingship. In this respect, however, Kautilya lived in the times of transition as can be seen from the fact that he devotes one full book (XI) to strategies for overthrow of clan republics and oligarchies.

65. On the post-Vedic modification of the "heroic ideal" and the transition from the "disinterested act" to the "rationalised act" see the valuable discussion in Drekmeyer, at 147-162.

66. It is an over-simplification of the complex thought of Kautilya and Hobbes to readily attribute to them this particular image of man: still less of course is the analogy fair to man because to say the least any attempt at attributing a nature to him is doomed to failure and can be no more than arbitrary elevation of a pronounced trait to the status of "man's nature." See the brief but thought-provoking remarks on this aspect in H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Anchor Paperbacks, 1959), 12-13.

There is also ample textual evidence in Hobbes' writings to dispel this simplistic view commonly attributed to him e.g., Hobbes contends that "...though the wickes were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending." De Cive, (ed. by S.F Lampley, 1949), Preface at 12. A closer reading of Hobbes may yield an interpretation that his too is an "as-if" view of human nature providing a rationale for political philosophy. For brief, conventional summaries of Hobbes' thought see Cairns, Legal Philosophy from Plato to Hegel (1949) 246-271; and Bowie, Western Political Thought (1948), 310-332.

67. See Kane, Vol. III, at 88-92; and the useful description in Kosambi, op. cit. supra n. 26, at 145-146.
the repeated apprehension of matasanyaya may have been one clever device on the part of ancient thinkers to legitimate the monarchical system and to invest it with some initial magico-religious significance.68

The ideal of chakravartin, lying at the heart of mandala theory, may perhaps never be fully explained; like war, the means through which it was sought to be attained almost continually in Indian history. War, Quincy Wright tells us in a Polonius-like formulation69 has "politicotechnological, juro-ideological, socio-religious, and psycho-economic causes".70 But war has been a subject of Wright's monumental and indispensable study. A similar study in the ideal of chakravartin now awaits labours à la Alexandrowicz.

68. For a description of the Kāliyuga see Kane, Vol. III at 885-902; and see Drexmeier at 244-262 passim.


70. Q. Wright, *Study of War* (1942), 41.